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Refusing to kill: Selective conscientious objection and professional military duties  
 
This paper explores the legal implications of objections of conscience against participation in 
particular military activities or conflicts (selective conscientious objection) as these are expressed by 
professional members of the armed forces. It does so by exploring how established human rights 
principles and norms related to the right of conscientious objection to military service may be extended 
to professional members of the armed forces seeking a discharge from military duties. The paper 
outlines applicable human rights standards relating to objections of conscience and compares how 
objections by professional members of the armed forces are dealt with by the judiciary in the United 
Kingdom and Germany. Finally, the paper uses empirical research data to map the recognition of 
selective conscientious objection to military duties in other member states of the Council of Europe that 
operate with fully professional armies and provides an extensive analysis of state practice identifying 
significant gaps, best practices and future challenges for the Council of Europe’s member states.  
 
1. Introduction 
 
The relationship between professional service personnel1 and the armed forces of a state is 
significantly different from the relationship between the state and conscripts, i.e. ordinary 
citizens liable for national military service for a defined period of time. Professional 
servicepersons enter into contracts of employment with the armed forces of their state and 
are expected to carry out specific contractual duties (Moskos 1977: 14). Conscripts, on the 
other hand, retain most of their rights as civilians when conscripted into the armed forces 
and cannot be regarded as ‘volunteers’, waiving their rights without their free and 
uninformed opinion (Rowe 2006: 32). 
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An objection to military activities can take two principal forms, either as an absolute or as a 
selective objection. An absolute conscientious objection is characterised by a general objection 
to military conflict where the person is willing to undertake a genuinely civilian service as 
an alternative form of national service, but is not willing to perform service that is in any 
way associated with the military services of the state. This is not to be confused with total 
objection which is used to describe situations where conscientious objectors object to any 
kind of mandatory national service, either military or alternative (PACE 1986: 7). 
 
Selective conscientious objection concerns the selective opposition to participation in 
particular armed conflicts. Selective conscientious objection can be explained as a break 
away from core tenet of the pacifist ideology which declares an opposition to all forms of 
violence and the use of lethal force. Professional members of the armed forces that are 
already in service may experience greater legal challenges when confronted by serious 
moral dilemmas regarding their participation in military operations. The pacifist ideology 
does not accept that war can ever be justified; therefore the acceptance of claims of selective 
conscientious objection as a valid ground for discharge on grounds of conscience has been 
far more controversial than absolute conscientious objection (Allen 1946: 11). Allowing 
exemptions from military duties to acting military personnel expressing a selective 
objection to participation or deployment within specific conflict situations is possible in 
some states (Clifford 2011: 22), even though commentators have identified considerable 
problems in the processing of their claims (Wilson 2008: 665). This is evidenced by the 
large number of conscientious objection applications in states that participated in the US-led 
military intervention against Iraq, of which very few had been granted (Yoo 2003: 563). 
 
Although governments may be reluctant to recognise a legal right to selective conscientious 
objection, perhaps owing to a fear that this could obstruct or negatively affect the morale 
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and consistency of their armed forces, one should not disregard that individuals with an 
ethically-driven objection to a particular military operation may have a genuine basis to 
support a discharge from military duties on grounds of conscience. The lack of clear 
guidelines providing for the exemption of individuals from military duties when selective 
conscientious objections arise, could lead to sentencing persons that may otherwise have a 
genuinely-held conscientious objection for disobeying a lawful command (Armed Forces Act 
2006 Art 12; Lyons v R 2011). 
 
2. International standards on selective conscientious objection  
It follows from the discussion above that domestic procedures for exemption from military 
duties on grounds of conscience may be more complicated for professional members of the 
armed forces than conscripts. This is due to the fact that those who are employed on a 
permanent basis in the armed forces of a state would need stronger evidence to establish 
that their beliefs changed while in service and that this forbids them from engaging in 
military activities, either in general or in particular military operations. It may however be 
argued that according to the recommendations of various international and regional human 
rights bodies, conscientious objections to military service may develop in military personnel 
while in service. In this regard, the Committee on Legal Affairs and Human Rights in its 
2001 Report stated that permanent members of the armed forces should in certain 
circumstances also be able to apply for conscientious objector status (Committee on Legal 
Affairs and Human Rights 2001). 
 
Similarly, in Recommendation 1518 (2001) the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of 
Europe (hereinafter “PACE”) recommended that the Committee of Ministers invite those 
Member States that have not yet done so to introduce into their legislation, the right for 
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permanent members of the armed forces to apply for the granting of conscientious objector 
status (PACE 2001: 5). 
 
The principle was endorsed by the Committee of Ministers in Recommendation No. 
CM/Rec (2010) 4 which provides the most advanced and detailed account of the rights of 
both conscripted and professional members of the armed forces. According to the 
recommendation, professional members of the armed forces should be able to leave the 
armed forces for reasons of conscience (PACE 2001: 42). The Committee of Ministers was 
influenced by the findings of the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe 
(OSCE/ODIHR 2008: 46), which highlights that the application of the right to 
conscientious objection to persons who voluntarily serve in the armed forces is based on the 
view that an individual’s deeply held convictions can evolve and that individuals voluntarily 
serving in armed forces may over time develop conscientious objection to bearing arms 
(Commission on Human Rights 2006). 
 
The Explanatory Memorandum to Recommendation CM(2010)4 emphasises the changing 
nature of conscientious beliefs and provides that: 
 
[…] a person’s beliefs, either religious or philosophical, are not fixed in time 
and therefore the protection of freedom of thought, conscience and religious 
cannot be reduced to the time before joining the armed forces. A 
serviceperson’s beliefs may also evolve when experiencing specific situations, 
notably in armed conflict. Professional members of the armed forces should 
have the right to make a request to leave the armed forces for reasons of 
conscience which should be examined within a reasonable time. Pending the 
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examination of such request, the requester should be transferred to non-combat 
duties where possible (CDDH 2010: H). 
 
This Recommendation sets out a requirement that professional members of the armed 
forces should not be persecuted if they are holding a valid conscientious objection and 
should not be denied the opportunity to submit an application for exemption from military 
duties if such an objection arises. Yet, extending the protection of the right to professional 
members of the armed forces is a widely contested question within the member states of the 
Council of Europe.  
 
The question whether the European Convention on Human Rights should extend to 
professional members of the armed forces is often a controversial matter at national level, 
particularly where military personnel are deployed to missions abroad. In R(on the 
application of Smith) (FC) (Respondent) v. Secretary of State for Defence (Appellant) and another 
[2010] UKSC 29, the UK Supreme Court did not find that individuals serving in the armed 
forces have the same Convention (ECHR) rights as civilians. The issue whether British 
soldiers killed during military operations abroad were, at the time of their deaths, within the 
jurisdiction of the United Kingdom for the purposes of Article 1 ECHR has been examined 
in Allbutt, Ellis and Smith v MOD [2012] EWCA Civ 1365, where the Court of Appeal on its 
decision of 19 October 2012 ruled that the claims under Article 2 should be struck out on 
the basis that the soldiers did not fall within the scope of the United Kingdom’s Convention 
jurisprudence. The applicability of the Convention with regard to the right to a fair trial for 
particular groups, including soldiers and prisoners is also, according to the European Court 
of Human Rights, subject to the ‘very nature of the offence in question’. In this regard, the 
case of Campbell and Fell v. United Kingdom (1984, para 71) makes a distinction between 
’criminal’ and ‘disciplinary’ offences for the purposes of the Convention. The unauthorised 
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absence of professional military personnel (i.e ‘absence without leave’ (‘AWOL’) or 
‘desertion’) would give rise to a disciplinary offence that is subject to military rather than 
civilian scrutiny, even though the right to an effective appeal to a civil tribunal is 
safeguarded by international and regional human rights treaties.  
 
3. An overview of state practice within the Council of Europe member states 
 
The last two decades have seen the recruitment of fully professional military personnel to 
replace conscripted armies, with the overwhelming majority of Council of Europe Member 
States transitioning from conscripted to professional armies since 1995. At present, almost 
two thirds of the Council of Europe member states operate with fully professional armies. 
The rights of professional staff members and, in particular, the right to be discharged from 
military service on grounds of conscience for those who voluntarily join the armed forces on 
their own free will for a fixed or indeterminate period of time has drawn the attention of the 
Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe, which acknowledged in one of its 
Recommendations, that members of the armed forces do not surrender their human rights 
and fundamental freedoms upon joining the armed forces (CoM (2010)4: 21) . 
 
The question of the recognition of the right to conscientious objection for professional staff 
members of the armed forces remained unexplored until 2006, when PACE adopted 
Recommendation 1742 recognising that the ending of conscription and the 
professionalisation of the armed forces in several countries created new needs. It thus 
requested that the Council of Europe promote respect for human rights within the army 
ranks and increase human rights awareness among their own military personnel (PACE 
2006: 3). Most recently in 2010, the Committee of Ministers’ Recommendation added 
emphasis on the need to ensure that the governments are complying with the principles set 
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out in the Council of Europe’s recommendations both in law and practice, not only in 
relation to conscripts but also in relation to the civil, political and economic rights of 
professional members of the armed forces.  
 
In Member States which have transformed their armed forces to employ all-volunteer 
professional personnel, the dissemination of information regarding the rights of armed 
forces personnel and particularly the right to conscientious objection is less frequent, 
particularly due to the fact that a legal framework has not yet been established to envisage 
such a right for professional members of the armed forces.  
 
In the Republic of Ireland there is no procedure set out for the examination of applications 
for exemption based on conscientious grounds. On the other hand, in the Netherlands, 
professional members of the armed forces are informed of their rights at the initial training 
for all personnel, as part of the curriculum for basic training. In Portugal, while conscription 
was in place, citizens were adequately and mandatorily informed by the Cabinet of Civil 
Service of Conscientious Objectors, local municipalities and recruitment centres, of the rules 
and requirements of the Law on Conscription at the time of conscription and before 
incorporation and admission to the Armed Forces. However it is unclear whether 
professional servicepersons in Portugal are currently informed in their contracts of the 
possibility of terminating their contract on a conscientious basis. In Slovakia, information 
on the rights and obligations of military personnel are available through the military 
administrative offices in military units and facilities, and in electronic form through the 
website of the Ministry of Defence. In Slovenia, professional members of the armed forces 
are informed of their rights and the procedures available to exercise them before enlistment 
in the Slovenian Armed Forces. 
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The principle stipulating that professional members of the armed forces should have the 
right to be discharged from their duties if they developed a genuine conscientious objection, 
has not yet been well-accepted by the majority of the Member States of the Council of 
Europe. At present, only six out of the twenty-seven Member States with professional 
armies recognise such a right either by legislation or through domestic policies and 
procedures.2 These are the United Kingdom, Germany (right to conscientious objection 
protected under the German Constitution), the Netherlands, Portugal, Sweden and 
Switzerland.3 Various domestic bodies have suggested that professional members of the 
armed forces may be able to withdraw from their contract on compassionate grounds, not 
necessarily having to prove that they have an objection of conscience. This may justify the 
considerably small number of applications made on grounds of conscientious objection in 
the Council of Europe member states. In this regard, the French Board member of the 
European Bureau of Conscientious Objection has submitted that the French authorities 
rarely receive applications for exemption on grounds of conscience by professional members 
of the armed forces. It may thus be argued that the number of applications for exemption 
from military duties on grounds of conscience has been reduced where transition from 
conscription to fully professional armies took place due to the existence of alternative 
grounds or options for objectors. 
 
 
 
 
3.1. Selective conscientious objection in the United Kingdom 
 
Conscription has been suspended in the United Kingdom since 1963. The right of 
conscientious objection for professional members of the armed forces is provided in 
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administrative procedures for each of the three services of the British armed forces, i.e. the 
Army (Instruction 006), the Royal Navy (Order 0801) and the Royal Air Force (AP3392 vol. 
5, Leaflet 113).4 Claims are handled administratively in the applicant’s chain of command. 
These procedures are not statutory regulations, but procedures for administrative action 
and are therefore not found in either primary or secondary legislation. A discharge can be 
made on compassionate grounds but the availability of this right is not reflected anywhere 
in the call-out materials received by professional servicemen, including the ‘terms of service’ 
for each of the three categories. In addition to this, access to the procedure for registering a 
conscientious objection is largely unknown to serving personnel (ForcesWatch, 2013). The 
Explanatory Memorandum to the Armed Forces (Enlistment) Regulations of 2009, calls for 
these procedure to become more visible, because, as the Memorandum explains, making the 
regulations on enlistment more visible by including them in a statutory instrument ensures 
not only that they are properly scrutinised, but also that they are published and that 
servicemen may easily ascertain their rights and obligations. 
 
In Khan v RAF [2004], concerning the refusal of a reservist to serve at the time of the 
invasion of Iraq, the appellant was charged with the offence of being ‘absent without leave’ 
since he did not submit any documents explaining to the Royal Air Force that he had a 
conscientious objection to the said service. The High Court accepted that the 1997 
Regulations were accessible, even if their effect had not been expressly made part at the 
stage of call-out of the reservist (the appellant), nevertheless it emphasised that ‘the call-out 
materials in this case, like the 1997 Regulations, do not mention conscientious objection 
expressly. In that respect, it would seem that the information provided to the recalled 
reservist could be improved.’ (Khan v RAF, para 57). While acknowledging the practical 
issues created by the absence of a clear legal framework regulating objections made on 
grounds of conscience, the Court maintained the view that the regulations are practically 
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effective and can therefore protect a person wishing to be discharged on grounds of 
conscience, provided that a sincere and genuine claim is held by the applicant.  
 
The Court in Khan had dismissed the claim that conscientious objection was protected 
under Article 9 ECHR. The position of the European Court of Human Rights had not been 
determined, as the Council of Europe had not yet engaged with the question of extending 
the right of conscientious objection for professional members of the armed forces. 
Furthermore, the decision in Khan predates both Recommendations 2006 and CM(2010)4.  
 
A genuine conscientious objection in the UK Forces results in a discharge on compassionate 
grounds. If the claim is dismissed by the superior officer handling the application, there is a 
right to appeal to an independent public authority dissociated from the Ministry of Defence, 
the Advisory Committee on Conscientious Objection (ACCO).5 To ensure the independence 
and impartiality of the authority, hearings are held in public, in premises away from the 
Ministry of Defence. If the Committee decides that the applicant does not have a valid 
objection on grounds of conscience, then the person concerned is still subject to complying 
with the terms of their employment, and must therefore continue their service until 
completion of their contract.  
 
Issues regarding the availability of information on the right and the means of acquiring 
conscientious objector status have been identified by NGOs. One of these issues concerns 
the sentences imposed to servicemen for whom the claims for recognition as conscientious 
objectors may be rejected by the military chain of command. According to Forces Watch, 
the Armed Forces are the only employers in the United Kingdom who legally require their 
employees to commit themselves for several years, with the risk of a criminal conviction if 
they try to leave sooner. 
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In the case of Lyons v R [2011], a Royal Navy medical advisor refused to undertake arms 
training for his imminent deployment to Afghanistan, after he was informed at a medical 
training event that in his deployment to Afghanistan he should not waste resources in 
treating civilians. He formed the view that his involvement in this war was wrong and 
admitted that he had been influenced by what he had read in the press, which led him to 
believe that his participation would result to accountability for civilian casualties (Lyons v R, 
para 8). His argument was deemed by the Advisory Committee on Conscientious Objection 
(‘ACCO’) and the Martial Appeal Court to be a political objection to a particular military 
engagement and not a genuine conscientious objection to all forms of war. Nevertheless, his 
Commanding officer supported the application and concluded that the appellant’s claim was 
genuine (Lyons v R, para 18). The applicant was therefore convicted by a Court Martial at 
Portsmouth for intentionally disobeying a lawful command contrary to Section 12(1)(a) of 
the Armed Forces Act 2006. He was sentenced to seven months' military detention, 
reduction from the rank of Leading Medical Assistant to Able Seaman and dismissal from 
the service. 
 
He appealed the decision and his case was considered by the Martial Appeal Court, which 
ultimately rejected his appeal on the basis that he had volunteered for military service, and 
so voluntarily accepted the responsibilities which go with such service, including the risk of 
deployment in a dangerous situation. The Martial Appeal Court stated that if such an 
objection was allowed, this could put at immediate risk the lives of comrades, the success of 
the operation and the safety of the civilian population, while it was also emphasised that 
training on the use of arms was an operational requirement imposed for the protection of 
service personnel and those under their care (Lyons v R, para 35). Even though the 
applicant was a medical assistant and arguably had protected status under the terms of the 
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Geneva Conventions, the policies of the Ministry of Defence required weapons training for 
defence purposes and for the protections of the persons being under his medical care, 
regardless of whether his claim for discharge on conscientious grounds would succeed. 
 
The Martial Appeal Court was cautious to avoid setting a precedent that would allow 
members of the Armed Forces to refuse participation in conflict zones. Allowing soldiers to 
invoke political arguments and disobey lawful orders by requesting to opt out from 
particular military operations or training sessions on the basis of their beliefs was deemed to 
be dangerous to the cohesiveness and discipline that is required by service personnel. It has 
to be emphasised that the appellant was not sentenced for having expressed a request for 
discharge on grounds of conscience, but for ‘disobeying a lawful command’ to undertake 
weapons training, which is significantly different to disobeying a command that would 
require him to be engaged in warfare. As Deakin observes, military courts have been 
unwilling to accept ‘conscience’ as the issue and prefer to examine the issue of selective 
conscientious objection on military grounds such as obedience of orders (Ellner et al 2014). 
 
3.2. The case of Germany  
 
The situation in Germany with regard to the applicability of the right of conscientious 
objection to professional members of the armed forces is rather different. Under German 
law, the right of conscientious objection is a fundamental right of every citizen and is 
safeguarded by the German Constitution (Grundgesetz, Art 4(3)). The right to conscientious 
objection is being recognised to both conscripts and professional members of the armed 
forces.6 The right is enshrined in Article 4(3) of the 1949 Basic Law and Art 2(6) of the 2003 
Law on Conscientious Objection which made the law applicable to both conscripts and 
professional soldiers and provided for alternative community service. 
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 Additional provisions for the application of the right to professional soldiers were laid 
down by a decree issued on 21 October 2013, which stipulated that the procedure for the 
submission of applications for exemption on conscientious grounds was administratively 
independent from the German Military Forces.  
 
In Germany, national military service was suspended in July 2011. As a result, the 
responsibility for examining applications for exemption from military duties on grounds of 
conscience by professional servicemen lies with the Federal Office for Family and Civil 
Duties. With the suspension of conscription in 2011, the Federal Office of Civilian Service 
(formerly part of the Federal Ministry for Family Affairs, Senior Citizens, Women and 
Youth), the body responsible for the control and administration of alternative civilian 
service for conscientious objectors was re-organised and renamed as ‘Federal Office of 
Family Affairs and Civil Society Functions’ (‘BAfzA’). BAfzA took responsibility for the 
control and administration of a new type of voluntary social service for both men and 
women (Bundersfreiwilligendienst). In essence, this type of service fulfils the roles 
previously undertaken by conscientious objectors in hospitals, retirement homes, emergency 
medical services and public utility institutions in the fields of ecology, culture and sports. 
The voluntary civilian service has a duration of no less than six, and no more than eighteen 
months, while volunteers receive an allowance of at least 335 euros per month, free health, 
accident and liability insurance, contractually regulated holidays and accompanying seminar 
days (Federal Volunteer Service 2013).  In its first year, the service could enlist at least 
30,000 volunteers, whereas the target in 2012 was raised to 35,000, according to 
information provided by the Federal Office of Family Affairs and Civil Society Functions.  
 
Since the suspension of national military service, the German Armed Forces are liable for 
the administration of three types of military service: the “Soldatenim Freiwilligen 
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Wehrdienst’ (‘FWDL’) where volunteer soldiers are required to perform military service of 
up to twenty-three months; the ‘Soldaten auf Zeit’ (‘SaZ’) where soldiers volunteering for 
service have signed up for a period between two and twenty years; and finally, the 
‘Berufssoldaten’ which includes professional soldiers without time restrictions in their 
contracts. The constitutional right to conscientious objection, as enshrined in Article 4(3) of 
the Constitution still applies to all the aforementioned categories of volunteers and for 
professional members of the armed forces. 
 
Although German legislation makes no explicit reference to selective conscientious objection 
by professional soldiers, a case decided by the Federal Administrative Court of Leipzig in 
June 2005 shed some light on the selective objection controversy (BverwG 2 WD, 21 June 
2005). The case concerned the refusal by a professional soldier, Major Florian Pfaff, to 
operate software developed by the military and to obey military orders of his senior officers 
in fear that he would have served the ‘unlawful’ (as he perceived it) participation of 
Germany in the war against Iraq. On 27 March 2003 he informed his colleagues that his 
refusal to contribute to the military intervention against Iraq stemmed from the view that 
any participation would have violated fundamental rules of international law. He 
subsequently refused to follow the orders of his Superior and as a result, on 9 February 
2004 he was disciplined and demoted to the rank of Captain by a Military Disciplinary 
Tribunal. The applicant appealed against this decision before the Federal Administrative 
Court of Leipzig (‘Bundesverwaltungsgericht’), arguing that he should be acquitted from 
disobeying an order on the basis that he had serious reservations with regard to the legality 
of Operation Iraqi Freedom, and that he should be allowed to exercise his right to freedom 
of conscience as protected by the German Constitution. The Federal Administrative Court 
delivered a ground-breaking judgment, acquitting the soldier and held that the soldier’s 
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right to freedom of conscience required that he be offered alternative tasks that were not 
related to a way that he had reasonably believed to be illegal (Baudisch 2006: 911). 
 
It was noted that, even if the soldier had not formed a clear view with regards to the legality 
of the military intervention against Iraq, some credible doubts existed with regards to the 
legality of the intervention from a public international law perspective (BverwG 2 WD, para 
4.1.4.1.). While the Court avoided expressing a conclusive opinion on the legality of the 
intervention, it is important to observe that the Court focused on the Constitutional right of 
freedom of conscience, noting that this should be respected and that the Armed Forces 
should allow its members to undertake an alternative type of action, including duties of 
alternative civilian service, in order to ensure that objections of conscience are reasonably 
accommodated (BverwG 2 WD, para 4.2.4.4.). It was expressly stated that if an individual 
has doubts about the legality of military intervention, and consequently, his conscience is in 
conflict with the obligation to carry out superior duties, the concerned individual is not 
under a strict obligation to follow orders, even though he has to explain his objection and 
establish that such an objection is based on serious and truthful considerations. This allows 
for a reversal of the burden of proof; i.e. it is not the soldier who has to prove that his refusal 
to follow orders was lawful, but it is for the government to adduce evidence to prove that 
the military action does not violate principles of public international law and/or the 
German Constitution (BverwG 2 WD, para 4.1.5.3.2.). 
 
The decision of the Court to find that the soldier was excused from following superior 
orders and was entitled to an ‘alternative course of action’ (‘Handlungsalternative’) that did 
not affect his conscience (BverwG 2 WD, para 4.1.2.5.) is important for two reasons. First, it 
provides an interesting commentary and legal analysis into the arguments related to the 
legality of the US-led military operation in Iraq. Second, it reiterates the importance of the 
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constitutional protection of the right to conscientious objection in German law that is still 
strongly defended by the judiciary and applied to professional members of the armed forces 
even in cases where the decisions of the executive are contested at judicial level by members 
of the armed forces.  
 
The German case may be usefully contrasted with the British case of Lyons, where the UK 
Court of Appeal held that the appellant’s objection was based on a political opinion on the 
lawfulness of the US-led intervention in Afghanistan. This may suggest that the United 
Kingdom give more emphasis to ensuring obedience to the policies of the armed forces, and 
consequently overlooking questions regarding the legality of an intervention or 
participation in a military intervention. The UK Ministry of Defence is of the view that 
‘service personnel are fully committed to giving their best in defending our country and its 
allies; this includes the requirement to bear arms and accept all assignments and 
deployments’. The latter suggests that military personnel in the United Kingdom are 
required to refrain from making a conscientious decision regarding the disputed legality of 
an operation (Steyn 2001; Qureshi 2004) and refuse to take part in a conflict which they 
consider unlawful, either because it is has not been given an express or implied 
authorisation by the United Nations, or when there are doubts as to customary principles of 
international law being violated, as a result of such an intervention. As the judgment in 
Lyons v. R indicates, there is still a strong perception regarding obedience of orders as an 
indispensable characteristic of military discipline that may be trumped by the right of 
military personnel to make conscientious decisions and refuse to comply with a military 
order regarding their involvement in particular operations. 
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3.3. The Netherlands  
 
The Kingdom of the Netherlands suspended conscription in 1997. The Constitution still 
contains an obligation for conscription but in practice the Dutch Armed Forces consist of 
voluntary service members only. While conscription was in place, the right of conscientious 
objection was guaranteed by Article 99 of the Constitution of the Netherlands which States 
that ‘exemption from military service because of serious conscientious objections shall be 
regulated by an Act of Parliament’. 
 
Article 2 of the 1962 Law on Conscientious Objection for Service Members defines 
conscientious objections as ‘insurmountable conscientious objections to the personal 
fulfilment of military service in connection with the use of force in which a person in the 
fulfilment of his service can be involved’. Some parts of the law have now been suspended 
and consequently the fulfilment of civilian service is not applicable to professional members 
of the armed forces. However, professional members can still invoke Article 9(3) of the 1962 
Law on Conscientious Objection for Service Members to be recognised as conscientious 
objectors and be discharged from the Armed Forces as soon as possible. Professional 
members are informed of their rights and procedures available to exercise them at the initial 
training for all serving personnel, as a part of the curriculum for basic training. According 
to the Dutch Ministry of Defence, there have been no cases of conscientious objection by 
voluntary service personnel since 1997. The procedure for application is outlined below.  
 
The procedure for the submission of applications is not substantially different from the 
procedure applying to conscripts before the suspension of military service. The Ministry of 
Defence initiates an inquiry into the objections of the applicant, which is carried out by one 
or more members of the Advisory Commission, under the administration of the Ministry of 
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Defence. The members of the Commission are appointed and dismissed by Royal Decree and 
the applicant is given the opportunity to represent himself and give evidence before a formal 
decision is made, and before forwarding their decision to the Minister of Defence. According 
to the Ministry of Defence, voluntary service personnel with conscientious objections can 
apply for an honourable discharge, without any obligation to give the reasons for their 
refusal. If the Minister rejects the application, there is a right to appeal to the Advisory 
Commission which conducts an investigation with at least three of its members. Upon a 
third dismissal of the application, there is a right to appeal to the department of 
administrative law of the Council of State (1962 Law on Conscientious Objection, Article 
7(b)), which gives the applicant the opportunity to appeal the decision before an impartial 
tribunal that is dissociated with the Ministry of Defence.  
 
In relation to partial conscientious objections to particular military operations, even though 
conscientious objections are traditionally acknowledged as ‘grave objections against all 
forms of armed service’, the Ministry of Defence is of the view that voluntary service 
personnel may apply for an honourable discharge for military service if their involvement to 
a particular military operation is at odds with their conscientious beliefs. An honourable 
discharge would have the same effect for both total objectors and partial objectors, since 
there would be no alternative offered to a professional serviceman in the same extent that it 
would be offered for a conscript being released of his military obligations, therefore a 
discharge may be obtained without the obligation to reveal the reasons.  
 
3.4. Portugal 
 
Finally, Portugal abolished national military service in 1999 with Law 174/1999 in order to 
reform its armed forces and transform them into a fully professional army. The right of 
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conscientious objection to military service is a constitutional right, recognised under Article 
41(6) of the Portuguese Constitution which States that ‘the right to be a conscientious 
objector, as laid out by law, shall be guaranteed’. According to Article 276(4) of the 
Constitution, ‘conscientious objectors who by law are subject to the performance of military 
service shall perform civic service with the same duration and degree of arduousness as 
armed military service’. In 2009, the NGO ‘War-Resisters International’ submitted that 
Portugal did not recognise the right of conscientious objection to professional members of 
the Armed Forces (Speck 2007), which was confirmed in 2011 by the European Bureau for 
Conscientious Objection (EBCO 2011). However, according to the Portuguese Ministry of 
Defence ‘while there is no norm that expressly establishes the right to conscientious 
objection by military personnel of the Armed Forces, any citizen regardless of being 
military personnel or not, can initiate the procedure by which the right is recognised, there 
being no limitations to its use on military personnel’. This means that the same application 
procedure that was established by Law no. 7/92 on Conscientious Objection which 
regulates the question of conscientious objection, can still be read in conjunction with the 
Law on Military Service (Law no. 174/99 of 21 September 1999, as amended by Law no. 
1/2008 of the 9 May 2008), by a professional serviceman wishing to withdraw on grounds 
of conscience.  
 
A provision is found in Act No. 6/85 as adopted by the Portuguese Parliament on 4 May 
1985, granting conscientious objector status ‘to those whose convictions, whether they are 
based on religious, moral or philosophical grounds, forbid them to use force against other 
human beings’ (PACE 1986). Furthermore, according to Article 2 of Law 7/1992 
establishing who can object and on what grounds, ‘conscientious objectors are considered as 
those citizens who believe that for religious, moral, humanistic or philosophical reasons, 
they cannot legitimately employ violent means of any kind against any person, even for the 
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purpose of national, collective, or personal defence’. It would seem from a literal 
interpretation of the law that legislation accepts only absolute conscientious objection to all 
forms of violence against others, therefore a selective objection to particular military 
operations would probably not be accepted. Professional members of the armed forces 
deciding to withdraw from their services on grounds of service are required to terminate 
their contract if the objector is working in a contractual or voluntary basis or through a 
request for resignation as permanent staff.  
 
According to the Portuguese Ministry of Defence, there are no implications or 
consequences for members of the Armed Forces who terminate their service with the 
Armed Forces on the grounds of conscientious objection, as the legal effects of such a 
situation are exactly the same as those for members of the Armed Forces who terminate 
their service on any other grounds or legally admitted reasons. 
 
4. Conclusion 
 
This paper has argued that a limited number of Council of Europe member states allow 
members of the armed forces to be released from their contractual duties on grounds of 
conscience. Resignations particularly on grounds of conscience are not envisaged in 
domestic legislation in the majority of states and therefore claims may be brought on 
different grounds to terminate employment. Resignation may be possible even when an 
application for discharge is rejected by the armed forces, since in most jurisdictions, a 
decision would be subject to some form of judicial review. Nevertheless as discussed in the 
detailed empirical analysis above, it is possible that requests for exemptions from particular 
military duties on the basis of a genuine conscientious objection can be accommodated as 
indicated by the German model, where the constitutional right to conscientious objection 
22 
 
was extended to the case of a soldier who selectively opposed to be engaged in a particular 
military operation on grounds of conscience. Since selective conscientious objection assumes 
the legitimacy of some types of military action, states should maintain some discretion as to 
how requests for exemption are to be accommodated. The decision of the German Federal 
Administrative Court in Pfaffer will most likely come to the forefront of academic debate 
over the applicability of conscientious objection standards to professional members of the 
armed forces. 
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NOTES 
1. The term ‘professional members of the armed forces’ is used to describe professional service 
personnel that join the armed forces of their own free will, voluntarily choosing to pursue a 
military career for a fixed or indeterminate period of time. 
 
2. A survey conducted by the author, based on information received by competent Ministries 
across the Member States of the Council of Europe, indicates that only a small number of 
Member States recognise a right of selective conscientious objection to particular military 
operations in their legislation. The governments of the United Kingdom and Croatia stated 
that although they do provide for a right of selective conscientious objection or recognise 
the term in their national laws, applications may be considered on their individual merits 
and an honorary discharge or early termination of contract may be granted on 
compassionate grounds. Germany allows for selective conscientious objections if it is 
demonstrated that a military intervention may be in conflict with customary rules of 
international law, however this is not stipulated in national legislation on conscientious 
objection. 
3. Information obtained by the author, provided by the Republic of Ireland, C&A Branch 
(Entry and Promotion); Ministry of Defence of the Netherlands, Directorate of Legal Affairs 
– Department of International and Policy Issues; Portuguese Ministry of National Defence 
(General Director); Ministry of Defence of the Slovak Republic, Defence Policy, 
International Relations and Legislation Department (Human Resources Policy and Strategy 
Section); Embassy of the Republic of Slovenia in London (www.london.veleposlanistvo.si); 
Portuguese Embassy in London upon communication with the Ministry of National 
Defence, Reference No. 10.11 Proc. 1/2012, V/Oficio n.886; Germany- 
BundesamtfürFamilie und zivilgesellschaftlicheAufgaben (Federal Office of Family Affairs 
and Civil Society Functions); German Federal Office for Family and Civil Duties; UK 
Ministry of Defence (Deputy Chief of Defence Staff (Personnel and Training) Secretariat; 
EBCO (European Bureau of Conscientious Objection); Friedhelm Schneider, EBCO 
President. 
 
4. The United Kingdom has a tripartite system of recognising the right of its professional 
members of staff to seek discharge on grounds of conscience. These are provided in the 
following domestic procedures. For members of the territorial army: AP3392 vol. 5, Leaflet 
113, Procedure for Dealing with Conscientious Objectors within the Royal Air Force; For 
all members of the Royal Navy: Personnel, Legal, Administrative and General Orders 0801, 
Application for Discharge on Grounds of Conscientious Objection. For all members of the 
Regular, Territorial and Reserve Forces: Instruction 006 – Retirement or Discharge on 
Grounds of Conscience.  
5. According to the British Ministry of Defence, ‘the ACCO was established in 1970 to hear 
appeals from Service personnel whose applications to leave the Service on grounds of 
conscience have been rejected by the Service Authorities. Members of the ACCO are 
appointed by the Lord Chancellor. The panel consists of 8 individuals, of whom the 
Chairman and the Vice and Deputy Chairman must all be Queen’s Counsel. A quorum for a 
meeting of the Committee is a chairman together with two lay members. Hearings are held 
in public, and the procedure is informal. There is no wearing-in of witnesses, and, although 
the witnesses and the appellant may be questioned, there is no cross-examination. 
Information obtained by the author, provided by the British Ministry of Defence (Deputy 
Chief of Defence Staff (Personnel and Training) Secretariat, 31 January 2012. 
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6. In 2011, 1.398 German soldiers (406 temporary soldiers and 4 professional soldiers) 
demanded to be recognised as conscientious objectors. In the same year 1.171 soldiers have 
been granted conscientious objectors status. Information obtained by the author, provided 
by Friedhelm Schneider, EBCO President, 5 September 2012. 
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